Abstract-We adopt the universal composablity as Eve's distinguishability in secret key generation from a common random number between two distinct players without communication. Under this secrecy criterion, using the Rényi entropy of order 1 + s for s ∈ [0, 1], we derive a new upper bound of Eve's distinguishability under the application of the universal2 hash functions. It is also shown that this bound gives the tight exponential rate of decrease in the case of independent and identical distributions. The result is applied to the wire-tap channel model and to secret key generation (distillation) by public discussion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random privacy amplification based on the universal 2 condition [1] has been studied by many authors [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [30] , [6] . This technique is originally aimed for random number extraction [2] , [3] . It can be applied to secret key generation (distillation) with public communication [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [3] , [4] and wire-tap channel [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , which treats the secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper. (For details of its application, see e.g. the previous paper [6] .) When random privacy amplification is implemented by a universal 2 hash functions, it can yield protocols for the above tasks with a relatively small amount of calculation.
Similar to the study [2] , [30] for random privacy amplification based on the universal 2 condition, the previous paper [6] focused only on the mutual information with the eavesdropper. However, as the secrecy criterion, many papers in cryptography community [22] , [3] , [4] , [5] adopt the half of the L 1 norm distance, which is also called the variation distance or Eve's distinguishability. Because this criterion is closely related to universally composable security [22] , it is called the universal composability and is required to evaluate the leaked information based on the L 1 norm distance from cryptography community viewpoint.
In this paper, we adopt the L 1 norm distance as the secrecy criterion, i.e., the universal composability, and evaluate the secrecy for random privacy amplification. In the independent and identical distributed case, when the rate of generation random M. Hayashi is with Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Aoba-ku, Sendai, 980-8579, Japan and Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117542. (e-mail: hayashi@math.is.tohoku.ac.jp) numbers is smaller than the entropy of the original information source, it is possible to generate the random variable whose L 1 norm distance to the uniform random number approaches zero asymptotically. However, in the realistic setting, we can manipulate only a finite size of random variables. So, the speed of this convergence is very important. In the community of information theory, in order to discuss the speed, we often focus on the the exponential rate of decrease. This rate is called the exponent, and is widely discussed among several topics in information theory, e.g., channel coding [20] , source coding [13] , [31] , and mutual information criterion in wiretap channel [17] , [6] . However, the exponent has not been discussed in the community of cryptography as an important criterion. The purpose of this paper is establishing a systematic evaluating method for exponent for the L 1 norm distance in secure protocols.
In Section III, first, we focus on Bennett et al [2] 's evaluation for random privacy amplification, which employs the Rényi entropy of order 2. This evaluation was also obtained by Håstad et al [30] and is often called leftover hash lemma. Using a discussion similar to Renner [5] , we derive an upper bound for the L 1 norm distance under the univeresal 2 condition for hash functions, which is the main theorem of this paper (Theorem 1).
Next, we apply this theorem to the i.i.d. setting with a given generating rate and a given source distribution. Then, we derive a lower bound of the exponent of the average of the L 1 norm distance between the generated random number and the uniform random number when a family of universal 2 hash functions is applied. Next, we introduce a stronger condition for hash functions, which is called strongly universal 2 . We consider the n-independent and identical extension, and show that the exponential rate of decrease for this bound is tight under a stronger condition by using the type method [13] , which was invented by Csiszár and Körner [13] and is one of standard methods in information theory. Since our bound realizes the optimal exponent, it is thought to be powerful even for the finite length setting. However, if our protocol generating the random number is allowed to depend on the original distribution, there is a possibility to improve the exponent while it is known that asymptotic generation cannot be improved [26] . In Section IV, we derive the optimal exponent in this setting by using the Cramer's Theorem [27] and the type method [13] . Comparing these two exponents, we can compare the performances between the protocol based on universal 2 hash functions and the protocol depending on the information source.
In Section V, we consider the case when an eavesdropper has a random variable correlated to the random variable of the authorized user. In this case, when the authorized user applies universal 2 hash functions to his random variable, he obtain a secure random variable. When we apply Theorem 1 to the security by L 1 norm distance in this setting, we obtain a tighter evaluation (59) than existing evaluation than that directly obtained from the previous paper [6] .
In Section VI, we focus on wire-tap channel model, whose capacity has been calculated by Wyner [12] and Csiszár and Körner [13] . Csiszár [14] showed the strong security, and many papers [6] , [33] , [34] treat this model with mutual information criterion. The previous paper [17] derived bounds for both exponential rates of decrease for the security criterion based on the L 1 norm distance as well as the mutual information between Alice and Eve. It obtained a bound for the exponential rate of decrease concerning the L 1 security criterion. In this paper, we apply (59) to wire-tap channel model, and obtain the evaluation of the exponent of the L 1 security criterion. In Section VII, it is shown that the evaluation obtained in this paper is better than that by the previous paper [17] . In a realistic setting, it is natural to restrict our codes to linear codes. In Section VIII, using (67), we provide a security analysis for a code constructed by the combination of an arbitrary linear code and the privacy amplification by universal 2 hash functions. This analysis yields the exponential rate of decrease for the L 1 security criterion. Overall, since (59) and (67) are derived from Theorem 1, all of the obtained results concerning the wire-tap channel model can be regarded as consequences of Theorem 1.
Further, in Section IX, we obtain the bound for the L 1 security criterion in one-way secret key generation. In Appendix A, we prove Theorem 2 mentioned in Subsection III-A. In Appendix B, we prove Lemma 6 given in Subsection IV.
Relation with the previous paper [6] The main difference from the previous paper [6] is that the analysis on this paper is based on the universal composability while that on the previous paper [6] is based on the mutual information criterion. In the first step, this paper derives an evaluation (Theorem 1) of the equality of the uniform random number generation by universal 2 hash functions based on the L 1 norm criterion. Applying Theorem 1, we treat several security problems. Since this paper treats the same security problems as the previous paper with the different criterion, some of protocols used in this paper were used in the previous paper [6] . That is, the coding protocols used in Sections VI, VIII and IX are used in Sections III, V, and VI in [6] , respectively While these protocols are described in [6] , we describe the whole protocols in this paper for the readers' convenience.
For the uniform random number generation, this paper gives the tight exponential rate of decrease for the L 1 norm distance, while the previous paper [6] gives a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on Shannon entropy. Concerning the secret key generation without communication, this paper gives a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on the universal composability, while the previous paper [6] gives a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on the mutual information criterion. Applying Pinsker inequality (5), we can derive a lower bound of the exponential rate of decrease based on the universal composability from the lower bound by [6] . As is shown in Lemma 8 in Subsection V-B, our lower bound is (strictly) better than combination of Pinsker inequality and the lower bound by [6] (except for special cases). Note that application of Pinsker inequality (5) or (6) yields the half of the lower bound of the exponent of the mutual information as a lower bound of the exponent of universal composability. Indeed, we give a numerical example at Fig. 2 , in which, our bound is strictly better than that by [6] .
Concerning wire-tap channel in a general framework, the code given in this paper is quite similar to that in the previous paper [6] . However, the evaluation method in this paper is different with that of the previous paper [6] because the analysis in this paper is based on the universal composability while that in the previous paper [6] is based on the mutual information. In this model, we can derive a lower bound for the exponential rate of decrease based on the universal composability by the combination of Pinsker inequality (5) and the result in [6] . As is shown in Section VII, our lower bound is better than this lower bound by [6] . Section VIII treats a more realistic setting by using linear codes. Even in this setting, as is explained in Remark 1, our lower bound is (strictly) better than the lower bound by [6] (except for special cases mentioned in Lemma 8). The same observation can be applied to secret key generation by public communication, which is discussed in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
First, we briefly explain several notations and basic knowledge in information theory. In order to evaluate the difference two distributions P X andP X , we employ the following quantities: the L 1 distance (variational distance)
and the KL-divergence
These definitions can be extended when the total measure is less than 1 i.e., a P A (a) ≤ 1. In the following, we call such P A a sub-distribution. This extension for sub-distributions is crucial for the later discussion.
When a joint distribution P X,Y is given, we have the following equation
When P X ,P X are normalized distributions, as a relation between the KL-divergence and the L 1 distance, the Pinsker inequality
is known [19] . That is,
These relations will be helpful for the latter discussions.
III. UNIFORM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION

A. Protocol based on universal 2 hash function: Direct part
Firstly, we consider the uniform random number generation problem from a biased random number a ∈ A, which obeys a probability distribution P A when its cardinality |A| is finite. There are two types of protocols for this problem. One is a protocol specialized for the given distribution P A . The other is a universal protocol that does not depends on the given distribution P A . The aim of this section is evaluate the performance of the latter setting. In the latter setting, our protocol is given by a function f from A to M = {1, . . . , M }.
The quality of the random number obeying the subdistribution P A is evaluated by
where P A mix is the uniform distribution on A. We also use the Rényi entropy order 1 + s:
The L 2 distance is written by using the Rényi entropy order 2 as follows.
Now, we focus on an ensemble of the functions f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M }, where X denotes a random variable describing the stochastic behavior of the function f X . In this case, we adopt on the following quantity as a criterion of the secrecy:
where B is the random variable f X (A) and the final equation follows from (4) . Hence, when the expectation E X d 1 (P fX(A) ) is sufficiently small, the random variable f X (A) is almost independent of the side information X. Then, the choice f X can be communicated between Alice and Bob without revealing anything about f (A).
An ensemble of the hash functions f X is called universal 2 when it satisfies the following condition [1] :
Condition 1 (Universal 2 ): ∀a 1 = ∀a 2 ∈ A, the collision probability that f X (a 1 ) = f X (a 2 ) is at most 1 M . We sometimes require the following additional condition:
Condition 2: For any X, the cardinality of f −1
X {i} does not depend on i. This condition will be used in Section IV.
Indeed, when the cardinality |A| is a power of a prime power q and M is another power of the same prime power q, as is shown in Appendix II of the previous paper [6] , the ensemble {f X } can be given by the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity (X, I) [18] only with log q |A|−1 random variables taking values in the finite field F q . That is, the function can be obtained by the multiplication of the random matrix (X, I) taking values in F q . In this case, Condition 2 can be confirmed because the rank of (X, I) is constant.
Bennett et al [2] essentially showed the following lemma. Lemma 1: A family of universal 2 hash functions f X satisfies
This was also shown by Håstad et al [30] and is often called leftover hash lemma. Now, we follow the derivation of Theorem 5.5.1 of Renner [5] when one classical random variable is given. The Schwarzinequality implies that
The Jensen inequality yields that
Substituting (8) and (10) into the above inequality, we obtain
Using (11), we can show the following theorem as a generalization of (11) .
Theorem 1: A family of universal 2 hash functions f X satisfies
for 0 ≤ ∀s ≤ 1.
Substituting s = 1, we obtain
Since the difference between (11) and (13) is only the coefficient, Theorem 1 can be regarded as a kind of generalization of Bennett et al [2] 's result (10) .
′ }, and define the sub-distribution P
the idea of "smoothing" by Renner [5] yields that
Taking the expectation concerning X, we obtain
The inequality (11) yields
Combining (15), (16) , and (17), for R := log M , we obtain
, where we substitute
into R ′ . Next, we consider the case when our distribution P An is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of P A , i.e, (P A ) n . When the random number generation rate lim n→∞ 1 n log M n is R, we focus on the exponential rate of decrease of E X d 1 (P fX,n(An) ), and consider the supremum. When an ensemble {f X,n } of hash functions is a family of universal 2 hash functions from A n to {1, . . . M n }, Theorem 1 yields that
On the other hand, when we apply the Pinsker inequality [19] to the upper bound for the mutual information obtained by the previous paper [6] , we obtain another bound max 0≤s≤1
, which is smaller than (18) .
B. Protocol based on universal 2 hash function: Converse part
In oder to show the tightness of the exponential rate of decrease (18) under the universal 2 condition, we consider the following ensemble.
Condition 3 (Strongly universal
Under the strongly universal 2 ensemble, and any subset Ω ⊂ A with |Ω| < M satisfies
Its proof is given in Appendix A. In order to derive the inequality opposite to (18) from Theorem 2, we employ the type method [19] . In the type method, when an n-trial data a n := (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n is given, we focus on the distribution p(a) := #{i|ai=a} n , which is called the empirical distribution for the data a n . In the type method, an empirical distribution is called a type. In the following, we denote the set of empirical distributions on A with n trials by T n . The cardinality |T n | is bounded by (n + 1) |A|−1 [19] , which increases polynomially concerning the number n. That is,
This property is the key idea in the type method. When T n (Q) represents the set of n-trial data whose empirical distribution is Q, the cardinality of T n (Q) can be evaluated as [19] :
where ⌈x⌉ is the minimum m satisfying m ≥ x, and ⌊x⌋ is the maximum m satisfying m ≤ x. Since any element a ∈ T n (Q) satisfies
we obtain an important formula
Using the above knowledge, we can show the following proposition:
where D(Q P A ) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence a∈A Q(a)(log Q(a) − log P A (a)). Proof: Choose an arbitrary empirical distribution Q ∈ T n satisfying that H(Q) ≤ R. Then, due to (21), the cardinality |T n (Q)| is less than ⌊e nR ⌋. We choose the subset Ω n,Q with the cardinality ⌈ 1 2 e nR ⌉ so that it at least contains ⌈
Using (21) and (22), we obtain
Using Theorem 2 with Ω n,Q , we obtain
Since Q is an arbitrary empirical distribution Q ∈ T n satisfying that H(Q) ≤ R,
That is,
Due to the continuity of Q → H(Q), (Q P A ) and (20), the limit n → ∞ yields (24) .
When R ≤ H(A|P A ), the equation
is known as the strong converse exponent in the fixed source coding [19] , [13] , [31] , [24, (A21) ]. The maximum max 0≤s
Hence, in this case, due to (18), (24), (25) , and (26), we obtain
However, when R < R 1 ,
The lower bound in (18) does not coincide with the upper bound in (24) .
C. Comparison with evaluation by Holenstein-Renner [29]
In the above derivation, the key point is evaluating the probability P A (Ω R ′ ), which equals the probability (
In the community of cryptography, the n-i.i.d. setting is not regarded as an important setting because they are more interested in the single-shot setting. In such a setting, they sometimes use Holenstein-Renner [29] evaluation for P X (Ω R ′ ). They proved the following theorem.
Further, When |A| ≥ 3 and
(log(|A|−1)) 2 .
When |A| = 2, the inequality yields the following evaluation.
contains the parameter 0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Since this parameter is arbitrary, it is natural to compare the upper bound
given by (17) with that by Theorem 3. That is, using (17), we obtain the exponential evaluation
while Theorem 3 yields that
In this case, the upper bound is
In fact, the probability P A (Ω R ′ ) is the key quantity in the method of information spectrum, which is a unified method in information theory [32] . When the method of information spectrum is applied to the i.i.d. source, the probability P A (Ω R ′ ) is evaluated by applying Cramér Theorem (See [27] ) to the random variable log P A (a). Then, we obtain
which implies that our evaluation (17) gives the tight bound for exponential rate of decrease for the probability
In fact, the difference among these bounds is numerically given in Fig. 1 . Therefore, we can conclude that our evaluation (17) is much better than that by Holenstein-Renner [29] . That is, the combination of Lemma 1 and (17) is essential for deriving the tight exponential bound. 
Normal line:
2(log(|A|+3)) 2 log 2 (Lower bound by [29] ), Dashed line:
= 0.455.
IV. SPECIALIZED PROTOCOL FOR UNIFORM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
A. Main result of this section
Next, we consider a function f from A to {1, . . . , M } specialized to a given probability distribution P A . This problem is called intrinsic randomness, which was studied with general source by Vembu and Verdú [26] . The previous paper [25] discussed the relation between the second order asymptotic rate and the central limit theorem. In the following, for the comparison with the exponential rate of decrease for (25), we prove the following theorem, which gives the optimal exponential rate of decrease for a given rate generating uniform random number.
Theorem 4: When
where F n (R) is the set of functions f n from A n to {1, . . . , ⌊e nR ⌋}. Combining (27) and Theorem 4, we can compare the performances between a random universal protocol and the best specialized protocol. So, our exponential rate of decrease for the protocol based on universal 2 hash functions is slightly smaller than the optimal exponential rate of decrease for specialized protocols.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we will show the following two inequalities:
Inequality (31) is called the converse part and Inequality (32) is called the direct part in information theory community. In order to show respective inequalities, we prepare respective lemmas (Lemmas 2 and 4) with non-asymptotic setting in Subsection IV-B. In Subsection IV-C, using Lemma 4 and the concavity property, we show the converse part (31) . Also, using Lemma 2, we show the direct part (31) . In the latter derivation, we employ the method of type, which is one of standard method in information theory [19] .
B. Non-asymptotic evaluation
In order to treat the non-asymptotic case, we introduce the notation:
Then, the L 1 norm for two normalized distributions P and Q can be simplified to
which is a useful formula for the following discussion. Hence, we obtain the following lemma, which is useful for our proof of the direct part (32) .
Lemma 2: Any probability distribution P A and any function f from A to {1, . . . , M } satisfy that
Proof:
When
Thus, we obtain
where (37) and (38) follows from (35) and (36). Therefore, we obtain (34) . In order to show the converse part, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Assume that for two integers M ≥ N , two positive number sequences α 1 , . . . , α N and β 1 , . . . , β M satisfy that
Proof: First, we define f (1) := 1. For j > 1, we define f (j) inductively. When
. we define f (j) := f (j − 1). Otherwise, we define f (j) := f (j − 1) + 1. Then, the function satisfies the condition (39). Now, we consider the case when our distribution P An is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of P A , i.e, (P A ) n . Using Lemma 3, we have the following lemma, which is useful for our proof of the converse part (31) .
Lemma 4: For any probability distribution P A , there exists a function f n from A n to {1, . . . , M n } such that
where
Proof: In the first step, we define the function f n . In the second step, we show that the function satisfies (40).
we divide T n into three parts:
. These three parts have the following relation with the above two parts:
By using the integer n Q := ⌊
are written as n Q ≥ 1 and n Q < 1, respectively. Note that, since n Q is a non-negative integer, n Q < 1 is equivalent with n Q = 0.
Due to (22) , the condition that e
is equivalent with the condition that P An (a) ≥
1
Mn for a ∈ T n (Q). Hence,
So,
we have
From the construction,
Next, we define f n on the whole set by modifying f ′ n as follows.
5) f n is the same as f ′ n on Ω ′ . 6) Due to (43), we can apply Lemma 3 to the case when {1, . . . ,
Our remaining task is to evaluate the value
Then, (41) implies that
Thus, (44) and (45) imply
Recall the condition 6). Lemma 3 guarantees that
Combining (46) and (47), we obtain (40).
C. Asymptotic evaluation
Next, we proceed to the asymptotic evaluation. First, using Cramer's theorem [27] , we obtain
Since
. Therefore, we obtain the converse part (31) .
In order to show the direct part (32), we will show the following lemma by employing Lemma 2.
Lemma 5:
In order to show Lemma 5, we prepare the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 6: When
Proof of Lemma 5: Due to (20) , (21) , and the continuity of Q → H(Q) and D(Q P A ), we obtain
From (23),
satisfies that
Due to (20) and the continuity of Q → H(Q) and D(Q P A ),
As is shown in Lemma 6, RHSs of (54) and (55) equal max 0≤s≤1 sH 1+s (A|P A ) − sR. Since max 0≤s sH 1+s (A|P A ) − sR ≥ max 0≤s≤1 sH 1+s (A|P A ) − sR, (48) implies that
Thus, applying (54), (55), and (56) to the RHS of (40), and using Lemma 6, we can choose a sequence {f n } such that
which implies (50).
V. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITHOUT COMMUNICATION
A. Application of Theorem 1
Next, we consider the secure key generation problem from a common random number A ∈ A which has been partially eavesdropped on by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common random number A ∈ A, and Eve has another random number E ∈ E, which is correlated to the random number A. The task is to extract a common random number f (A) from the random number A ∈ A, which is almost independent of Eve's random number E ∈ E. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function f to the common random number A ∈ A.
Then, when the initial random variables A and E obey the distribution P A,E , Eve's distinguishability can be represented by the following value:
mix ×P E is the product distribution of both marginal distributions P f (A) mix and P E , and P
mix is the uniform distribution on {1, . . . , M }. While the half of this value directly gives the probaility that Eve can distinguish the Alice's information, we call d 1 (P f (A),E |E) Eve's distinguishability in the following. This criterion was proposed by [22] and was used by [5] . Since the half of this quantity d 1 (P f (A),E |E) is closely related to the universally composable security, we adopt it as the secrecy criterion in this paper. As another criterion, we sometimes treat
Further, when P f (A) is the uniform distribution, the above both criteria coincide with each other.
Next, we consider an ensemble of universal 2 hash functions {f X }. Similar to (9), the equation
holds, where B is the random variable f X (A). Hence, when the expectation E X d 1 (P fX(A),E |E) is sufficiently small, the random variable f X (A) is almost independent of the random variables X and E. So, the above value is suitable even when we randomly choose a hash function.
In order to evaluate the average performance, we define the quantity
Note that when Eve's random variable E takes a continuous value in the set E, the relation (59) holds by defining φ(t|A|E|P A,E ) in the following way.
This definition does not depend on the choice of the measure on Y. By using Theorem 1 and putting t = s 1+s , any universal 2 hash functions {f X } satisfies the inequality:
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 2 . Therefore, there exists a function f such that
Next, we consider the case when our distribution P AnEn is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution of P AE , i.e, (P A,E ) n . Ahlswede and Csiszár [7] showed that the optimal generation rate
equals the conditional entropy H(A|E). That is, the generation rate R = lim n→∞ log Mn n is smaller than H(A|E). The quantity d 1 (P fn(An),En |E n ) goes to zero. In order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the supremum of the exponential rate of decrease (exponent) for d 1 (P fn(An),En |E n ) for a given R e 1 (P A,E |R)
Since the relation φ(t|A n |E n |(P A,E ) n ) = nφ(t|A|E|P A,E ) holds, the inequality (60) implies that
for t ∈ [0, 1/2]. That is, taking the maximum concerning t ∈ [0, 1/2], we obtain
where e φ (A|E|P A,E |R) := max
= −H(A|E), the right hand sides of (62) and (63) are strictly greater than 1 for R < H(A|E).
B. Comparison with the previous paper [6]
Next, we show how better our bound is than that by the previous paper [6] . The previous paper [6] shows the following in Section IIA. There exists a sequence of functions f n : A n → {1, . . . , ⌊e nR ⌋} such that (6), we obtain
with s = t 1−t . Concerning the comparison of both bounds, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 7: The inequality
holds for s ∈ (0, ∞). Thus, the equality condition is that the value a P A|E (a|e) 1+s does not depends on the choice e at the support of P E . Hence, we obtain the desired argument.
In order to compare two bounds e φ (A|E|P A,E |R) and e H (A|E|P A,E |R), we introduce the following value:
Then, we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 8:
for R < H(A|E). The equality in the first inequality holds if and only if the Rényi entropy H 1+s0 (A|P A|E=e ) does not depends on the choice e at the support of P E for s 0 := argmax 0≤s≤1 −φ( . Therefore, our exponent e φ (A|E|P A,E |R) is strictly better than the exponentẽ H (A|E|P A,E |R) by [6, Section IIA] except for the case satisfying the following two conditions:
does not depends on the choice e at the support of P E . For example, we consider the following case: A equals E, the set A has the module structure, (i.e., A is an Abelian group) and the conditional distribution P A|E (a|e) has the form P A (a − e). Then, the equality condition for the first inequality holds. Since 
In particular, the both exponents are numerically plotted in Fig. 2 when A = {0, 1}, and P A (0) = p, P A (1) = 1 − p. Proof: The first inequality and its equality condition follow from Lemma 7 and the definitions of e φ (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R). The second inequality follows from the inequality 
(direct application of (11) 
VI. THE WIRE-TAP CHANNEL IN A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Next, we consider the wire-tap channel model, in which the eavesdropper (wire-tapper) Eve and the authorized receiver Bob receive the information from the authorized sender Alice. In this case, in order for Eve to have less information, Alice chooses a suitable encoding. This problem is formulated as follows. Let Y and Z be the probability spaces of Bob and Eve, and X be the set of alphabets sent by Alice. Then, the main channel from Alice to Bob is described by
, and the wire-tapper channel from Alice to Eve is described by
x is the output distribution on the Bob's side with Alice's input x, and W E x is the output distribution on the Eve's side with Alice's input x. In this setting, in order to send the secret message in {1, . . . , M } subject to the uniform distribution, Alice chooses M distributions Q 1 , . . . , Q M on X , and she generates x ∈ X subject to Q i when she wants to send the message i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. Bob prepares M disjoint subsets D 1 , . . . , D M of Y and judges that a message is i if y belongs to D i . Therefore, the triplet (M, {Q 1 , . . . , Q M }, {D 1 , . . . , D M }) is called a code, and is described by Φ. Its performance is given by the following three quantities. The first is the size M , which is denoted by |Φ|. The second is the average error probability ǫ B (Φ):
and the third is Eve's distinguishability d 1 (Φ|E):
The quantity d 1 (Φ|E) gives an upper bound for the probability that Eve can succeed in distinguishing whether Alice's information belongs to a given subset. So, the value can be regarded as Eve's distinguishability. In order to calculate these values, we introduce the following quantity.
When the random variable Y takes a continuous value in the set Y while X takes discrete value, the above definition can be changed to
This definition does not depend on the choice of the measure on Y. That is, whenW x (y)f (y) = W x (y) for a positive function f ,
As is shown as Lemma 1 of [6] , φ(t|W, p) satisfies the following lemma.
Lemma 9: The function p → e φ(t|W,p) is convex for t ∈ [−1, 0], and is concave for t ∈ [0, 1]. Now, using the function φ(t), we make a code for the wire-tap channel based on the random coding method. For this purpose, we make a protocol to share a random number. First, we generate the random code Φ(Y) with size LM , which is described as Φ(Y)(a) = Y a for a = 1, . . . , LM by using the LM independent and identical random variables Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y ML ) subject to the distribution p on X . Gallager [20] showed that the ensemble expectation of the average error probability concerning decoding the input message A is less than (M L) t e φ(−t|W B ,p) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 when Bob applies the maximum likelihood decoder D ′ (Y) of the code Φ(Y). After sending the random variable A taking values in the set with the cardinality M L, Alice and Bob apply the above universal 2 hash functions f X to the random variable A and generate another piece of data of size M . Here, we assume that the ensemble {f X } satisfies Condition 2. Then, Alice and Bob share the random variable f X (A) with size M . This protocol is denoted by Φ(X, Y) Let E be the random variable of the output of Eve's channel W E . When p is the uniform distribution on the set C := {1, . . . , M L} and the joint distribution P C,E is given by P C,E (c, e) := p(c)W E c (e), the equations e φ(t|P
hold. For a given code Φ(Y), we apply the inequality (59) to Eve's distinguishability. Then,
for 0 ≤ ∀t ≤ guarantees that
2 . Now, we make a code for wire-tap channel by modifying the above protocol Φ(X, Y)
′ . First, we choose the distribution Q i to be the uniform distribution on f −1 X {i}. When Alice wants to send the secret message i, before sending the random variable A, Alice generates the random number A subject to the distribution Q i . Alice sends the random variable A. Bob recovers the random variable A by using the maximum likelihood decoder D ′ (Y), and applies the function f X . Then, Bob decodes Alice's message i, and this code for wire-tap channel W B , W E is denoted by Φ(X, Y). Since the ensemble {f X } satisfies Condition 2 and the secret message i obeys the uniform distribution on {1, . . . , M }, this protocol Φ(X, Y) has the same performance as the above protocol Φ(X, Y)
′ . Finally, we consider what code is derived from the above random coding discussion. Using the Markov inequality, we obtain
Therefore, the existence of a good code is guaranteed in the following way. That is, we give the concrete performance of a code whose existence is shown in the above random coding method. Theorem 5: There exists a code Φ for any integers L, M , and any probability distribution p on X such that |Φ| = M and
In the n-fold discrete memoryless channels W Bn and W En of the channels W B and W E , the additive equation
Thus, there exists a code Φ n for any integers L n , M n , and any probability distribution p on X such that |Φ n | = M n and
Since lim t→0 φ(t|W E ,p) t = I(p : W E ), the rate max p I(p :
can be asymptotically attained. Therefore, when the sacrifice information rate is R, i.e., L n ∼ = e nR , the exponential rate of decrease for Eve's distinguishability is greater than
VII. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING BOUND
In Subsection VII-A, we compare our exponent e φ (R|W E , p) with those derived by [17] , [6] in the general setting. In Subsections VII-B and VII-C, using discussion in Subsection V-B, we treat this comparison in special cases more deeply.
A. General case
Now, we compare the lower obtained bound e φ (R|W E , p) for the exponential rate of decrease for Eve's distinguishability with existing lower bounds [17] , [6] . Using the quantity
the previous paper [17] derived the following lower bound of this exponential rate of decrease:
The other previous paper [6] also derived the following lower bound:
for the exponential rate of decrease for the mutual information. By applying a discussion similar to Subsection V-B and Pinsker inequality (9), the bound (70) yields the bound
which is smaller than the lower bound e ψ (R|W E , p) because
Hence, in order to show the superiority of our bound e φ (R|W E , p), it is sufficient to show the superiority over the bound e ψ (R|W E , p). In the following, we compare the two bounds e φ (R|W E , p) and e ψ (R|W E , p) For this purpose, we treat e φ(t|W E ,p) and
. Reverse Hölder inequality [28] with the measurable space (X , p) is given as
for s ≥ 0. Using this inequality, we obtain
Thus, our bound e φ (R|W E , p) for the exponential rate of decrease is better than the existing bound e ψ (R|W E , p) [17] . Example 1: Assume that X = E = {0, 1}. We consider the following channel.
2 ) Then, the three bounds e φ (R|W, p), e ψ (R|W, p), and e ψ (R|W, p) with a = 0.05 are numerically compared as in Fig. 3 .
B. Additive case
Next, we consider a more specific case. When X = Z and X is a module and
any additive channel W E satisfies
and
for the uniform distribution p mix on X . Hence, our bound e φ (R|W E , p mix ) is the same as the previous bound e ψ (R|W E , p mix ). However, since 1 2−2t < 1 for t ∈ [0, 1/2), our bound e φ (R|W E , p mix ) is strictly better than the boundẽ ψ (R|W E , p mix ) by the other previous paper [6] when the maximum is attained by t ∈ [0, 1/2).
C. General additive case
We consider a more general case. Eve is assumed to have two random variables Z ∈ X and Z ′ ∈ Z ′ . The first random variable Z is the output of an additive channel depending on the second variable Z ′ . That is, the channel W
Hereinafter, this channel model is called a general additive channel. This channel is also called a regular channel [21] . For this channel model, we obtain e φ(s|W
Then, the equalities
hold. Hence, the observation in Section V-B can be applied to the comparison among e φ (R|W E , p mix ), e ψ (R|W E , p mix ), andẽ ψ (R|W E , p mix ). Due to Lemma 8, e φ (R|W E , p mix ) is strictly better than e ψ (R|W E , p mix ) andẽ ψ (R|W E , p mix ) except for the special case mentioned in Lemma 8.
VIII. WIRE-TAP CHANNEL WITH LINEAR CODING
In a practical sense, we need to take into account the decoding time. For this purpose, we often restrict our codes to linear codes. In the following, we consider the case where the sender's space X has the structure of a module. When an error correcting code is given as a submodule C 1 ⊂ X and the decoder by the authorized receiver is given as {D x } x∈C1 , our code for a wire-tap channel is given as
is given as the uniform distribution on the coset [x] := x + C 2 , and the decoding D [x] is given as the subset ∪ x ′ ∈x+C2 D x ′ . Next, we consider a submodule C 2 (X) of C 1 with cardinality |C 2 (X)| = L that is labeled by a random variable X. Then, the module C 2 (X) can be regarded as a random variable. Now, we impose the module C 2 (X) the following condition.
Condition 4: Any element x = 0 ∈ C 1 is included in C 2 (X) with probability at most L |C1| . Then, using (67), we can evaluate the performance of the constructed code in the following way.
Theorem 6: Choose the subcode C 2 (X) according to Condition 4. We construct the code Φ C1,C2(X) by choosing the distribution Q [x] to be the uniform distribution on [x] for [x] ∈ C 1 /C 2 (X). Then, we obtain
where P mix,S is the uniform distribution on the subset S. When the channel W E is additive, i.e., W E x (z) = P X (z − x), the equation φ(t|W E , P mix,C1+x ) = φ(t|W E , P mix,C1 ) holds for any x. Thus, the concavity of e φ(t|W
Thus, combining (79), (80), and (72), we obtain
That is, when L = e R , taking the minimum concerning 0 < ∀t < 1 2 , we obtain
When the additive noise obeys the n-fold i.i.d. of P on X n and L = e nR , we obtain
Similarly, when the channel W E is general additive, i.e., W
, combining (79), (80), and (74), we obtain
In the n-fold i.i.d. case, when L = e nR , we obtain
When X is an n-dimensional vector space F n q over the finite field F q , the bound can be attained by the combination of linear code and the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity (X, I) of the size m × (m − k) [6] . Hence, if the error correcting code C 1 can be realizable, the whole process in the above code can be realizable.
Remark 1: In the additive case, due to (73), the exponent of the upper bound given in (83) is the same as that given by the previous paper [17] . However, the code given in [17] is constructed by completely random coding. However, the code given in this section is based on the ordinary linear code. For the security, it requires only the universal hash condition. So, our construction requires smaller complexity than that given in [17] . In the general additive case, our exponents (86) is strictly better than that given in [17] , which is calculated in (77).
Next, we consider the relation with the other previous paper [6] in the general additive case. The protocol given in [6] is is quite similar to ours. However, as is shown in Lemma 8, except for the very special case, our exponent (86) is strictly better than that given in [6] , which is calculated in (78). Remember that the exponent given in [6] isẽ ψ (R|W E , p mix ), which is mentioned around (71).
IX. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION Furthermore, the above result can be applied to secret key generation (distillation) with one-way public communication, in which, Alice, Bob, and Eve are assumed to have initial random variables A ∈ A, B ∈ B, and E ∈ E, respectively. The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common random variable almost independent of Eve's random variable E by using a public communication. For this purpose, we assume that Alice and Bob can perform local data processing in the both sides and Alice can send messages to Bob via public channel. That is, only one-way communication is allowed. We call such a combination of these operations a code and denote it by Φ.
The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the final common random variable, the probability that their final variables coincide, and Eve's distinguishability d 1 (Φ|E) of the final joint distribution between Alice and Eve.
In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A has a module structure (any finite set can be regarded as a cyclic group). Then, the objective of secret key distillation can be realized by applying the code of a wire-tap channel as follows. First, Alice generates another uniform random variable X and sends the random variable X ′ := X + A. Then, the distribution of the random variables B, X ′ (E, X ′ ) accessible to Bob (Eve) can be regarded as the output distribution of the channel x → W B x (x → W E x ). The channels W B and W E are given as follows.
where P AB (a, b) (P AE (a, e)) is the joint probability between Alice's initial random variable A and Bob's (Eve's) initial random variable B (E). Hence, the channel W E is general additive.
Applying Theorem 5 to the uniform distribution P A mix , for any numbers M and L, due to (74), there exists a code Φ such that |Φ| = M and
In particular, when the joint distribution between A and B(E) is the n-fold independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) of P A,B (P A,E ), respectively, the relation φ(t|A n |E n |(P A,E ) n ) = nφ(t|A|E|P A,E ) hold. Thus, there exists a code Φ n for any integers L n , M n , and any probability distribution p on X such that |Φ n | = M n and 
Finally, we mention the relation with the previous paper [17] . Since the above discussion is an application of section VIII, the same comparison as Remark 1 is valid. Hence, our evaluation (91) is strictly better than that given in [17] except for the special case.
X. DISCUSSION
We have derived the tight evaluation for exponent for the average of the L 1 norm distance between the generated random number and the uniform random number when universal 2 hash functions are applied and the key generation rate is less than the critical rate R 1 . Using this evaluation, we have obtained an upper bound for Eve's distinguishability in secret key generation from a common random number without communication when a universal 2 hash functions are applied. Since our bound is based on the Rényi entropy of order 1 + s for s ∈ [0, 1], it can be regarded as an extension of Bennett et al [2] 's result with the Rényi entropy of order 2.
Applying this bound to the wire-tap channel, we obtain an upper bound for Eve's distinguishability, which yields an exponential upper bound. This exponent improves on the existing exponent [17] . Further, when the error correction code is given by a linear code and when the channel is additive or general additive, the privacy amplification is given by a concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix. This method can be applied to secret key distillation with public communication.
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APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 6 We choose s(R) such that d(sH1+s(A|P )) ds | s=s(R) = H(P 1+s(R) ) + D(P 1+s(R) P ) = R, where P 1+s (a) := P (a) Further, the concavity of s → sH 1+s (A|P ) and the condition d(sH1+s(A|P )) ds | s=1 > R imply that max 0≤s≤1 sH 1+s (A|P ) − sR = H 2 (A|P ) − R. Thus, we obtain (53).
